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This study has the purpose of analyzing the relationship between debt financing and 
earnings management on European listed companies, since previous literature report 
mixed results about the influence of debt financing on earnings management. The sample 
is composed by 1278 listed companies from 13 European countries, between 2007 and 
2016. Through this research it is tried to discover if the influence of debt financing on 
earnings management is negative, positive or both, suggesting a non-linear relationship. 
The results suggest that the influence of debt on earnings management is positive and 
that, the relationship between debt financing and earnings management is linear. Results 
also propose that earnings quality is negatively influenced by firm’s low profitability and 
positively influenced by firm’s return on assets.  
 









O propósito deste estudo é analisar a relação entre o endividamento e a qualidade dos 
resultados nas empresas cotadas Europeias, visto que, estudos anteriores apresentam 
opiniões díspares relativamente à influência do endividamento na gestão de resultados. A 
amostra é composta por 1278 empresas cotadas de 13 países Europeus, sendo o período 
de análise de 2007 a 2016. Através desta análise, pretende-se descobrir se a influência do 
endividamento na gestão de resultados é negativa, positiva ou ambas, sugerindo uma 
relação não linear. Os resultados sugerem que a influência é positiva e, 
consequentemente, que a relação existente entre estas duas variáveis é linear. Os 
resultados propõem também que a gestão dos resultados é influenciada negativamente 
pela baixa rentabilidade e positivamente pela rendibilidade do ativo.  
 
Palavras-chave: qualidade dos resultados; gestão de resultados; qualidades dos 
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The challenges of a twenty-one-century company are focused on economic 
development and especially in the financial globalization. Firms are in the presence of a 
global market, as they are interconnected with the global system, which is open to all the 
companies and encourages the flow of goods, capital and services. Since they have the 
need to adapt to this reality, companies became more competitive and aware to the market 
to be able to survive and grow. This necessity becomes stronger with the available access 
to financial information, since the external stakeholders demand higher quality to the 
process of decision making (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005),  being the earnings quality a 
major factor of choice.  
During the financial reporting process, managers have the opportunity to manage 
earnings, due to the flexibility and subjectivity of accounting standards. They can make 
the financial report look different from the reality, using the estimations and 
measurements in their behalf and make it appear appellative to the market. Therefore, 
earnings management is considered an intentional practice that mislead the external user 
of the information with the drive to obtain some private gain (Schipper, 1998). As such, 
firms are motivated to incur in this kind of practices.  
However, firms can not only use the flexibility that the standards provide, they 
can also violate them and incur in fraud. There are multiple examples of cases like this in 
the last few years, which increases the uncertainty related to financial reporting. 
The company’s capital structure and consequently the amount of debt financing 
and debt equity, is a factor that influences the need of financial report. As well, the 




differences between the reality and what was actually reported can be explained by the 
demand to fulfil the expectations of the market (Pope, 2003). 
The aims of this research are focus on the study of the relationship between debt 
financing and earnings management and the analysis of the influence of debt on earnings 
management, since it was only a considered focus of research by Ghosh & Moon (2010), 
that studied it in USA listed companies. Therefore, this research focus in European listed 
companies and it proposes to find if this relationship exists and how it behaves.  
The sample used is composed by 1278 listed companies from 13 European 
countries, and the observations are referred to the period between 2007 and 2016. As a 
proxy for earnings management, it was defined the amount of discretionary accruals 
obtained through the Jones model (Jones, 1991) modified by Dechow et al. (1995).  
The results of this study indicate that the level of debt is positively associated with 
earnings management, suggesting that companies with more debt financing incur in more 
earnings management practices. The hypothesis of a nonlinear relationship between the 
debt financing and earnings managemnt isn’t supported. The results also suggest that 
companies with higher cost of debt, more losses and lower return on assets have more 
earnings management practices.  
This study is helpful to the users of the financial reports, especially on the process 
of making financial decisions, as they can perceive that the amount of debt financial of a 
company can affect their financial reports. Also, it is hoped that it contributes to the 
literature about earnings management and, mainly, about the association between debt 
financing and earnings management. 




The remaining of this study is divided in 4 chapters. The subsequent chapter 
(chapter 2) gives some fundamental concepts to the study and summarize the previous 
literature that support this research and consider the relationship between debt financing 
and earnings management. Chapter 3 reveals the main hypothesis of the investigation, the 
selected data and its characterization and, finally, the methodology used. The following 
chapter (chapter 4) contemplates the discussion and analysis of the results. To finish, the 
last chapter is the 5th and holds the final conclusions, the limitations of the study and the 
suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Earnings Quality  
As IAS 1 defines, the role of the financial report is to give information that helps 
users to make economic decisions. The financial report information reduces the agency 
conflicts between the company and the external stakeholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Additionally, Francis et al. (2003) consider earnings as the principal performance metric 
used by investors and analysts and Corina & Miculescu (2012) argue that earnings 
influence the process of decision making. Subsequently, capital market participants only 
make good judgments and decisions based on high quality financial reports. This makes 
the earnings quality a summary indicator of a decision made (Francis et al., 2008). Also, 
Dechow & Schrand (2004, p.5) deliberate that “high quality earnings reflect the 
company’s current operating performance, is a good indicator of future operating 
performance and is a useful summary measure for assessing firm value”. Indeed, poor 
earnings quality can mislead investors resulting in information asymmetries 




(Bhattacharya et al., 2013), which prove the importance of high quality financial 
statements in the process of economic decisions (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005).  
Healy & Wahlen (1999, p. 368) define that “earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”.  In this context, Schipper (1998) suggested that, when incurring in 
earnings management, managers have “the intent of obtaining some private gain”. 
Beneish (2001) propose the existence of two perspectives of earnings 
management: the opportunistic perspective that focus on the use of the accounting 
information with the intent to mislead the investors and the information perspective that 
aims to give the knowledge about the managers’ expectations of the future firm’s cash 
flows.  
However, the opportunistic perspective domains the literature, since this practice 
reduces the earnings quality and, consequently, mislead the stakeholders about the firm.  
Several authors point that earnings quality is affected by managers incurring in earnings 
management (Leuz et al., 2003; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
  




2.2. Relationship Between Debt Financing and Earnings 
Management 
 
2.2.1. Negative Influence of Debt on Earnings Management 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) propose that managers may act in their own interest 
and not in the shareholder’s interest. In that way, shareholders can mitigate the agency 
conflicts by stablishing incentives for the managers. Yet, they do not monitor the behavior 
of management because the costs are higher than the benefits that it brings. On the 
contrary, private debt lenders, especially banks, are specialized in monitoring borrowers 
and mitigating agency conflicts (Diamond, 1984). Diamond (1984) consider that banks 
act like a delegated monitor, since they evaluate whom they lend to and have the ability 
to control the opportunistic behavior of managers.  
According to Jensen (1986), debt works like a monitoring device as it reduces the 
agency costs of Free Cash Flow by decreasing the Cash Flow that is available for 
managers to control. In other words, managers won’t invest in bad projects and waste 
resources as debt cuts the cash flow available for non-profitable investments. Similarly, 
Grossman & Hart (1982) see debt as a disciplinary instrument. By issuing debt, firms 
create the possibility of bankruptcy which makes managers act in shareholders’ interest, 
the market recognize this possibility and firm’s market value increases. Managers are 
willing to take the risk of bankruptcy because they benefit with the increase of market 
value of the firm, since their salaries depend on it, the probability of a takeover bid would 
be smaller, and it would be easier to raise capital. 
In addition, firms have the incentive to provide high earnings quality since it can 
reduce the costs of borrowing (Diamond, 1991). Francis et al. (2005) found empirical 




evidence that firms with low accounting quality experience higher costs of debt and 
García-teruel et al. (2010) suggest that firms with poor earnings quality face shorter debt 
maturities. 
Finally, Feltham et al. (2007) suggest that debt incentives firms to provide 
accounting information with higher quality and argue that accounting precision is 
positively related to debt. 
In sum, lenders demand higher quality accounting information, since it reduces 
the credit risk and managers can reduce the costs of borrowing if they act in the interest 
of debtholders and shareholders. Therefore, all these arguments suggest that there is a 
positive influence of debt on earnings quality. 
 
2.2.2. Positive Influence of Debt on Earnings Management 
Debt and earnings quality can also be related negatively. As suggest by An et al. 
(2016), firms that frequently manage earnings have higher financial leverage.  
Regarding the agency problem, managers may not act in the interest of 
debtholders, thus contractual arrangements are made, usually based on accounting 
numbers, “to reduce expropriation of wealth by managers” (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990)  
and so to protect the lender. According with Beneish (2001) and Iatridis & Kadorinis 
(2009), when firms are close to violate debt covenants (contractual arrangements) they 
tend to manipulate the accounting information as a way to avoid financial distress. This 
occurs because the consequences of violating a debt covenant are heavy. Lenders could 
demand the immediate repayment, increase the interest rate, impose additional covenants 
and put an end to the contract (Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, 1995).  




Moreover, when managers face a high level of debt they have incentives to use 
the financial statements as a way to reduce the prospect of violating debt covenants 
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Beatty et al., 2010). Therefore, firms are willing to reduce the 
quality of accounting information to avoid debt covenant violations (Feltham et al., 2007). 
Besides that, earnings quality is important to make decisions about the firm’s 
capital structure. This happens because, if a company has high quality information, it uses 
more equity financing, instead of debt financing (Chen et al., 2016). In that context, 
companies that present high earnings quality choose to be financed with equity and 
companies with poor earnings quality have to resort to debt financing. Although, in order 
to better access to capital debt markets, managers tend to use earnings management to 
make the firm look more attractive and healthy (Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009). 
In sum, firms may practice earnings management to avoid debt covenants 
violation and to access to access capital markets. In this sense, it is expected high debt 
levels to be associated with low earnings quality.  
 
2.3. Research Question 
Prior research on the relationship between debt financing and earnings 
management has found mixed opinions. Some authors find a negative relation, in which 
the presence of debt can damage the financial reports quality, and others support a positive 
relation, in which the debt can influence positively the quality of the reporting. Also, it is 
proved that the relationship may be non-linear, in which, lower debt levels have a positive 
influence on earnings management and high debt levels have a negative influence (Ghosh 
& Moon, 2010). 




Thus, the main goal of this study is to analyze the relationship between debt 
financing and earnings management and answer to the following research question: Is the 
relationship between debt financing and earnings management linear?  
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. The Earnings Management Measure 
Several measures are used in the literature to evaluate earnings quality (Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). Francis et al. (2004) considers that the accrual quality is the most valued 
between the earnings attributes. Besides that, this attribute provides measure about the 
firm’s performance that can, more precisely, reflect the expected cash flows, making it a 
good indicator of the earnings (Dechow, 1994).  
Hence, the amount of discretionary accruals is used as a proxy of earnings quality 
and consequently earnings management and  it were obtained through the Jones's model 
(1991) modified by Dechow et al. (1995).  
Jones (1991) created a model that consider the total accruals, more specifically, 
the discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management. The author considered 
that nondiscretionary accruals are constant and the change in the discretionary accruals is 
reflected essentially by the change in total accruals.  Besides that, the model is a function 
of the change in revenue and the level of property, plant and equipment, since these 
variables control the change in nondiscretionary accruals, as they are an effect of the 
changes on the firm’s economic conditions.  
Dechow et al. (1995) claimed that if earnings can be managed through the 
discretionary part of revenues, then Jones’s model didn’t consider these discretionary 




accruals. Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) assume that the practice of earnings 
management is responsible for the changes in credit sales and suggested the following 













)  (1)          
where, 
𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 = Discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡= Total accruals in year t for firm i; 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡= Total assets in year t from firm i; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡= Revenues in year t less revenue in year t -1 for firm i; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡= Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 from firm i. 
To obtain the estimates of 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽1𝑖 and 𝛽2𝑖 (ai, b1i and b2i), to each sector, it was 
used the ordinary least squares method. Total accruals where calculated through the 
traditional method used by  Dechow et al. (1995): 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where,  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡= Total accruals in year t for firm i; 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡= Change in current assets in year t for firm i; 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡=Change in current liabilities in year t for firm i; 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡= Change in cash equivalents in year t for firm i; 
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡= Change in debt included in current liabilities in year t for firm i; 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡= Depreciation and amortization expense in year t for firm i. 




The discretionary accruals obtained through the described model (1) are presented 
in absolute value, since earnings management increases with both positive and negative 
discretionary accruals. Therefore, the quality of the report decreases as this value gets 
higher, since they are proportional.  
 
3.2. Model and Variables  
The following model was used to answer the research question. 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (3) 
The discretionary accruals represent the dependent variable (DACC) and are used 
as a proxy of the earnings management.  
To obtain the best model it was used three methods, the pooled OLS, the fixed 
effects (FE) and the random effects (RE). The importance of considering them is related 
with the fact that they are suitable to panel data, since it is expected to exist non-
observable effects.  Besides that, the random effects model assumes that the not 
observable effect isn’t correlated with the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Thought the Hausman test it is possible to choose between the FE and the RE. Then, when 
the p-value is lower than 10% we accept that the FE is more suitable to the model. To 
prevent the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of standard errors, the 
robust and cluster (by country) options were selected.  
The first independent variable is DEBT and it was defined as the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. The DEBT2 is the second independent variable, it represents the square of 




DEBT and it is used as a way of perceiving if the relationship between the debt and the 
discretionary accruals is linear or not, following Ghosh & Moon (2010) among others.  
According to Francis et al. (2005), the COSTDEBT focus on the relation between 
debt financing and financial distress, that could influence positively the earnings 
management,  Ghosh & Moon (2010) also used it to study the same relation. This variable 
was obtained through the interest expense divided by the average total debt and it is 
expected to have a negative coefficient. 
The variable GROWTH is used as a way to perceived the firm’s growth 
perspectives. Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) and Boone et al. (2010) consider that firms 
with higher growth are positively associated with higher levels of earnings management. 
This suggests, that firms with higher performances have tendency to present poor 
earnings quality, as such it is expected a positive coefficient for this variable. The proxy 
used was calculated through the changes in sales from the prior year to the current year 
deflated by the prior year sales.  
The variable ROA (Return on Assets) is used to measure the financial performance 
of the company as define by Kothari et al. (2005), being this variable able to evaluate the 
differences of the firm’s performance. Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) argue that ROA 
has a negative effect on earnings management suggesting that companies with high levels 
of ROA have financial reports with higher quality. Therefore, the  coeficient of this 
variable is expected to be negative. This variable is the ratio between net profit and total 
assets.  
The independent variable LOSSES, was defined as the portion of firm-years that 
exhibit negative earnings from years analyzed. The importance of this variable focus on 




the relation of firm’s characteristics with earnings quality, as they are influenced by the 
business models and operating environments. Consequently, it is expected to have a 
positive coefficient, since it has positive influence on earnings management.  
Finally, the variables COUNTRY and INDUSTRY where used to control the effects 
on earnings quality produced by the country’ characteristics and the type of industry as 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) and Boone et al. (2010) detected. Besides that, the 
variable YEAR was also added as a control variable.  
 
3.3. Data and Sample 
The data used to obtain the sample of this study, was collected from the database 
Amadeus in July of 2017. The sample was composed by 7477 companies listed from the 
28-member states of European Union1, from 2007 to 2016. Accordingly with previous 
studies, it was necessary to exclude companies that practice financial and insurance 
activities and had public administration, since in these cases the accounting reports and 
regulation are different what makes the formation of accruals diverse too (Leuz et al., 
2003; Osma & Noguer, 2005). Additionally, to eliminate all the outliers the data is insert 
between the 1th and 99th percentile. The final sample is composed by 1278 companies, 
7484 observations, 17 industry sectors and 13 countries. 
Table I provides the composition of the sample by industry. The sample is mainly 
composed by 4 industries. The most represented industries are C (manufacturing) and M 
(professional, scientific and technical activities) with a percentage of 29,98% and 27,30% 
respectively.  
                                                          
1 The sample contains only countries that belong to the European Monetary Union. 













A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 10 61 0,82% 
B Mining and quarrying 5 21 0,28% 
C Manufacturing 372 2244 29,98% 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 26 134 1,79% 
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 8 51 0,68% 
F Construction 46 249 3,33% 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 128 756 10,10% 
H Transportation and storage 33 190 2,54% 
I Accommodation and food service activities 21 121 1,62% 
J Information and communication 169 892 11,92% 
L Real estate activities 58 308 4,12% 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 334 2043 27,30% 
N Administrative and support service activities 35 216 2,88% 
P Education 4 27 0,36% 
Q Human health and social work activities 11 76 1,02% 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 10 57 0,76% 
S Other services activities 8 38 0,51% 
Total  1278 7484 100,00% 
Note: The industry sectors were classified through the code of NAICS 2007 (AMADEUS) 




Table II, presents the composition of the sample by country, where the more 
represented country is by France (36,01%), followed by Germany (23,70%) and Italy 
(14,85%).  







Germany 294 1774 23,70% 
France 442 2700 36,01% 
Italy 184 1112 14,85% 
Spain 75 485 6,48% 
Portugal 6 6 0,08% 
Finland 74 389 5,20% 
Greece 113 691 9,23% 
Luxembourg 8 21 0,28% 
Austria 22 68 0,91% 
Slovenia 11 39 0,52% 
Netherland 11 11 0,15% 
Belgium 16 72 0,96% 
Slovakia 22 116 1,55% 
Total 1278 7484 100,00% 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table III provides the descriptive statistics of each variable of the model. The 
mean of the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 0,90257, which is a considerable 
value since it is in the range of 6,13e-06 and 3,6. The average company shows a debt ratio 
of 27,9%, a cost of debt of 5,6%, an annual growth around 5%, a percentage of years with 
negative profit of 12,5% and a ROA of 1,6%.  





Table III - Variables descriptive statistics 




DACC 7484 0,902572 0,0617837 0,107662 6,13e-06 3,608315 
DEBT 7518 0,278505 0,2596315 0,160360 0,003406 0,751052 
DEBT2 7518 0,103245 0,0674085 0,107169 0,000012 0,564080 
COSTDEBT 7518 0,05775 0,0520469 0,028821 0,007956 0,149776 
GROWTH 7518 0,050640 0,0357451 0,182147 -0,444147 0,943013 
LOSSES 7518 0,244516 0,1250000 0,276000 0 1 
ROA 7518 0,015519 0,0249734 0,062017 -0,291733 0,158378 
Notes: DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
DEBT2 – The square of the ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
COSTDEBT – Interest expense deflated by total debt (long-term + short-term) in year t from firm i;  
GROWTH – Change in sales from year t to year t-1 deflated by the year t-1 sales; 
LOSSES – Portion of years with negative earnings from firm i; 
ROA –  Return on assets obtain through the net income deflated by total assets in year t from firm i. 
 
In addition, the sample was divided in five portfolios of Debt and it was used the 
discretionary accruals (DACC) as a proxy for earnings management. Like Table IV 
shows, Debt 1 represents the observations with the lowest debt levels where the mean 
was 0,077 and Debt 5 contains the observations with highest debt levels where the mean 
was 0,524.  
Also, it was tested if the differences between the means of Debt 1 and Debt 2, Debt 
2 and Debt 3, Debt 3 and Debt 4 and, finally, Debt 4 and Debt5 were statistically 
significant, which was confirmed by the outputs described in Table IV. 
However, the results shown on Table IV do not prove the nonlinear relationship 
that was expected since the mean and median of the discretionary accruals always 
increase across the growing debt levels.  





Table IV - Residuals Across Debt Quintiles 
Debt Quintiles 
Debt DACC 
Mean Mean Median 
Debt 1 0,0773503 0,0712961 0,0508202 
Debt 2 0,1750676 0,0785242 0,0581832 
Debt 3 0,2594989 0,0843496 0,0612006 
Debt 4 0,3566431 0,0950821 0,06632 
Debt 5 0,5241134 0,1220906 0,077817 
Differences in Mean 
(t-statistic) 
   
Debt 1 – Debt 2  -2,631**  
Debt 2 – Debt 3  -2,0676*  
Debt 3 – Debt 4  -3,1928**  
Debt 4 – Debt 5  -5,4650***  
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the existence of statistical significance at the level of 5%, 1% and 0,01% 
respectively. 
DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i. 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the discretionary accruals (mean and 
median) and the debt quintiles. As one can see, the mean and the median discretionary 
accruals grows with the increase of debt. Moreover, comparing the increase percentage 
of the discretionary accruals between two consecutive debt quintiles, it is clear that the 
growth of discretionary accruals along the debt quintiles is not constant. The increase 
percentage between the last two consecutive debt quintiles is higher than in the other 
cases, which shows that the growth is not linear. 
  





Notes: DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i. 
 
4.2. Correlation Matrix  
Table V presents the Pearson correlations between the variables of the model. The 
correlation between Debt and Debt2 is the higher, since this second variable is the square 
of the first. Besides that, the other correlation values are lower than 0,22 suggesting that 
almost all the variables have a weak correlation with the others.  
The dependent variable (DACC) is positively correlated with the variables DEBT, 
DEBT2, COSTDEBT and LOSSES and these correlations are statistically significant. On 
the other hand, it is negatively correlated with the variable GROWTH and ROA, but 
only the correlation with ROA is statistically significant. These results suggest that 
companies with higher levels of debt and cost of debt, with more periods of losses and 


















 Figure 1 - Debt Financing and Discretionary Accruals 




Table V - Variables Correlation Matrix 
 DACC DEBT DEBT COSTDEBT GROWTH LOSSES ROA 



















































Notes: *, **, *** indicate the existence of statistical significance at the level of 5%, 1% and 0,01% respectively. 
DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
DEBT2 – The square of the ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
COSTDEBT – Interest expense deflated by total debt (long-term + short-term) in year t from firm i;  
GROWTH – Change in sales from year t to year t-1 deflated by the year t-1 sales; 
LOSSES – Portion of years with negative earnings from firm i; 
ROA –  Return on assets obtain through the net income deflated by total assets in year t from firm i. 
 
4.3. Regression Results 
The results from the regressions (executed in STATA 13) are presented in Table 
VI and Table VII. Table VI presents the results of regressions that comprehend only 
DEBT and DEBT2. The first column, (a), represents a univariate model using only debt as 
an independent variable. Debt serves as a point of reference for the relationship between 
earnings management and debt financing. In this model, it was obtained a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient for DEBT, which supports the idea that earnings 
management increases in the presence of debt. Therefore, the results of this univariate 
model suggest a positive relation between debt financing and earnings management.  
In column (b), it was included DEBT2 in the model, to study if the non-linear 
relationship exists. The R2 maintains the same value which reveals that the explanatory 
power of the model doesn’t change. The coefficient of DEBT is still positive and 




statistically significant, although the coefficient of DEBT 2 is not statistically significant. 
These results do not confirm the hypothesis of non-linear relationship between debt 
financing and earnings management  which is consistent with the conclusions taken 
after analyzing Table IV and Figure I. When debt increases the financial report’s quality 
decreases, which propose a dominating positive influence of debt on earnings 
management. Thus, when managers face high debt levels, they are more likely to 
practice earnings management. 
 
Table VI - Debt Financing and Earnings Management: Multivariate Results 
Variables  
Dependent variable: Discretionary 
Accruals 
(a) (b) 
Intercept -2,595(-14,10) -3,271 (-70,75) 
DEBT 1,355 (10,68)*** 1,127 (3,74)*** 
DEBT2 - -0,216 (-0,40) 
Country Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes 
N 7484 7484 
Prob > χ2 0,000 0,000 
R2 3,78% 3,78% 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the existence of statistical significance at the level of 5%, 1% and 0,01% 
respectively. 
Table reports the coefficients and the t-statistics in parenthesis.  
DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
DEBT2 – The square of the ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
  
Table VII represents the three different methods that could be used in the 
regression to obtain the most consistent results. As explained in Section 3.3., the Hausman 
test was used to perceive which is the best method between Fixed Effects and Random 




Effects. The results of this test conclude that the Fixed Effects is the model that gives the 
results with more assurance. Subsequently, to choose between the Pooled OLS and the 
Fixed Effects model it was used the F test. This test elected the Pooled OLS as the model 
that is more adaptable to this sample. Thus, this method is the one used to obtain the main 
results of this study.  
 
Table VII - Debt Financing and Earnings Management: Regression Methods 
Variables  
Dependent variable: Discretionary Accruals 





































Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 7484 7484 7484 
R2 5,32% 3,39 5,28 
F Test 9,80 7,71 - 
P-value 0,0000 0,0000 - 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the existence of statistical significance at the level of 5%, 1% and 0,01% 
respectively. 
Table reports the coefficients and the t-statistics (Pooled OLS and FE) or the z-statistics ( RE) in parenthesis.  
DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
DEBT2 – The square of the ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
COSTDEBT – Interest expense deflated by total debt (long-term + short-term) in year t from firm i;  
GROWTH – Change in sales from year t to year t-1 deflated by the year t-1 sales; 
LOSSES – Portion of years with negative earnings from firm i; 
ROA –  Return on assets obtain through the net income deflated by total assets in year t from firm i. 




In comparison with model (a) and model (b) from Table VI, the coefficient of DEBT 
becomes higher and persist statistically significant. This suggest that companies with 
higher debt practice more earnings management, which is consistent with Beatty & Weber 
(2003) and Dechow et al. (1995). Also, the DEBT2’s coefficient gets bigger but isn’t 
statistically significant which doesn’t support the hypothesis of the non-linear relationship 
between debt financing and earnings management, since the previous results contradict 
it. Therefore, in contrast with the expected, this results are not consistent with Ghosh & 
Moon (2010) findings about the USA companies. 
Besides that, the LOSSES variable comprehends a positive coefficient too, which 
reinforce the idea that companies with negative results practice more earnings 
management than companies with positive earnings. This variable is also statistically 
significant to the model. Additionally, ROA, that represents the return on assets, has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient, which suggests a negative influence on 
earnings management. This proposes that, when the return on assets is higher, the 
earnings management practices are less frequent, which was expectable from the previous 
literature (Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008).  
Finally, only 5,32% of the change in the discretionary accruals (absolute value) is 
explained by the model variables. It is common in regressions like these, that use accruals 
as independent variable, to obtain lower values of R2 (Arun et al., 2015). Through the p-
value of the F test (p-value = 0,00) it is possible to reject the null hypothesis and confirm 
that the model is valid to explain the change in the discretionary accruals.  
In sum, the results suggest that the relationship between debt financing and 
earnings management is linear, and assume that debt has a positive influence on earnings 
management. 




4.4. Robustness Analysis  
As a robustness analysis, were made some changes on the main regression. The 
first change was to remove the variable that presented a coefficient that wasn’t statistically 
significant, GROWTH. This alteration is important since, not only, this variable may be 
declining the model’s explanatory power, but also, it is the only variable that presented 
values in the Person Correlation Matrix that had no statistical significance with DACC 
and COSTDEBT.  The results of this regression, presented in Table VIII, are identical 
with the ones obtained before. The R2 turns out to be smaller but this decrease is not 
significant. 
Table VIII - Robustness Analysis 
 Excluding GROWTH (1) Excluding France (2) 
Variables  Coefficient t P-value Coefficient t P-value 
Intercept -2,708 -14,67 0,000 -2,549 -12,67 0,0000 
DEBT 1,3845 4,04 0,000 0,9922 2,25 0,025 
DEBT2 -0,7152 -1,32 0,188 -0,3309 -0,48 0,629 
COSTDEBT 0,4713 0,89 0,372 07335 1,1 0,270 
GROWTH - - - 0,1464 1,34 0,181 
LOSSES 0,3733 5,54 0,0000 0,2087 2,43 0,015 
ROA -1,17784 3,99 0,0000 -1,7886 -4,49 0,000 
Country Dummy  Yes   Yes  
Industry Dummy  Yes   Yes  
Year Dummy  Yes   Yes  
N  7484   7484  
Prob > F  0,0000   0,0000  
R-squared  5,28%   5,02%  
Notes: DACC – Discretionary accruals in absolute value;  
DEBT– Ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
DEBT2 – The Square of the ratio of total Debt (long-term + short-term) to total assets in year t from firm i;  
COSTDEBT – Interest expense deflated by total debt (long-term + short-term) in year t from firm i;  
GROWTH – Change in sales from year t to year t-1 deflated by the year t-1 sales; 
LOSSES – Portion of years with negative earnings from firm i; 
ROA – Return on assets obtain through the net income deflated by total assets in year t from firm i. 
 
The second change in the multivariate model is the exclusion of the most 
representative country in the sample. France represents 36% of the sample and this large 




representation could change the results obtained before. Through the results presented in 
Table VIII, it’s observable that they didn’t diverge from the previous models. The R2 
becomes even smaller, although the general conclusions remain, and this part of the 
sample didn’t mislead the results.  
 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. General overview of the study 
The quality of the financial report is a factor of the utmost importance, as long 
as it influences the decisions of the company’s stakeholders. The lack of earnings quality 
can mislead the market, as it gives the wrong perception of the company and make the 
investors incurring in wrong decisions. This quality can be affected by several factors, 
being one of them the Debt Financing. 
The aim of this study was to perceive the impact of debt financing on earnings 
management and analyze this relationship, in European listed companies. The previous 
literature suggests different approaches for this relationship. Some authors support a 
positive negative of debt on earnings management, proposing that the quality of the 
financial report gets higher in the presence of debt financing. On the other hand, other 
authors affirm that the influence is positive, suggesting that debt financing has a negative 
impact on the financial report quality. Ghosh & Moon (2010) studied this relationship 
and found it nonlinear in the USA, as they discover that the influence of debt on earnings 
quality is negative only when debt is high, as in the remaining cases the influence is 
positive. In this sense, this study pretends to observe if the relationship found in the listed 
companies of USA is replicable in Europe.  




The results of this study suggest that European listed companies, in the presence 
of debt, practice more earnings management, which is consistent with the previous 
literature (An et al. ,2016) . Besides that, the hypothesis of the non-linear relationship 
between debt financing and earnings management is rejected, proposing that this behavior 
doesn’t happen in European listed companies.  
Additionally, it is conclusive that companies with more losses by year and with 
lower returns on assets have more discretionary accruals and consequently incur more in 
practices that denigrate the earnings quality.  
 The results of this study contribute to the literature about the earnings management 
and their relationship with the debt financing, specifically, in European listed companies.  
 
5.2. Limitations 
This study has several limitations that could misleading the conclusions.  
The first limitation deals with the difficulty of measuring the earnings 
management. Leuz et al. (2003) describe this process as problematic and hard, since it 
could manifest itself in diverse forms, something that is found in several studies of this 
nature. 
The fact that, there was an economic crisis, that begun in the end of 2007, could 
make the behavior of companies, and their managers, change, as the comportment of 
banks on conceiving debt to companies. Consequently, this study conclusions can be 
misleading by this singularity.  
Lastly, this study doesn’t make a distinction between the public and private debt, 
which could make an impact in the results, as prior research affirms that loan covenants 
are more stringent in private debt (Smith, 1993). 




5.3. Further Research 
To further research it is proposed to study these realities using different measures 
for earnings managent, since, as it was referred before, it is difficult to measure it with 
the precision needed. It could also be interesting to study the European non-listed 
companies, as banks and creditors could have different actions and behaviors with them. 
As Ghosh & Moon (2010) did, further research could analyze this relationship using only 
private debt or by distinguish the type of debt. Finally, it is suggested to make the same 
study, focused on the relationship between debt financing and earnings management, in 
a period after crisis, since the results obtained could be influenced by the existing 
economic crisis in the period analyzed.   
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